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THE ENERGY CHALLENGE* 
Enrique V. Iglesias 
THE DEBATE ON STYLES OF DEVELOPMENT 
T h e subject of styles of development is not foreign to us, nor has it only recently become one of 
CEPAL's concerns; it has been one for some time. Originally serving as an analytical category to 
dispel the anxiety of economists over the social failure or inefficiency of growth processes, it later 
acquired elements developed in the expanded international discussion of the various dimensions 
of development. The debate on development has thus been forced to follow the pronouncements 
of scientists which were publicized at a very opportune moment indeed by the work of the Club of 
Rome, through which the discussion on the meaning for humanity of the depletion of natural 
resources or the appearance of physical restrictions on the process of economic growth was 
brought up at the international level. These facts implied not only a scientific, but also an 
economic, social and political challenge, and at those levels the need to examine the styles of 
development which exert irrational pressure on natural resources and challenge physical 
restrictions was raised and discussed. 
But the scientific questioning of development styles is not the only approach to them. Other 
discussions, from different vantage points, provide new angles from which to analyse in various 
ways the predominant style of development and to search for alternative styles. 
I have just mentioned one of these approaches: the social angle. In discussing the social 
efficiency of growth, we condemn the inability of the reigning style of development to solve the 
social problems of Latin America and of the developing world in general. 
Another angle from which both the economic and the social efficiency of styles of 
development in underdeveloped countries have been challenged vigourously is that of the 
"population problem"; that is, the explosive growth of the population and of urbanization, with all 
the concomitant problems that these phenomena have entailed. 
The subject of technology functions in the same way. Conservationists, who have been 
concerned with this subject for many decades, have always drawn attention to the consequences 
that development styles based on the massive incorporation of modern technologies into 
backward societies could have as a potential source of aggression against their cultural patterns, 
leading consequently to the alienation of man from society and nature. 
Another angle from which development styles in the developing world are being discussed is 
that of the autonomy of development, a subject which was not only raised at the ideological level 
in theories about imperialism and other related approaches, but has also been expressed in the 
political sphere through the process of decolonization and the explosion of the Third World onto 
the international scene. In the light of this concern, autonomy of development is another angle 
from which the particular characteristics of a certain development style can be evaluated. 
But irrespective of the angle from which one views it —society, technology, culture or 
autonomy of development— the debate on development styles is extremely important in that it 
allows development to be appreciated fully and brings out the whole range and complexity of the 
subject. Even more importantly, it highlights the essentially political aspect of development 
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processes. In reading the inspired reports prepared at the Founex and Cocoyoc meetings or by the 
Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, in which alternative styles of development are discussed, one 
feels that they all have one basic limitation: although all are brillant in diagnosing the problem 
and analysing the various aspects of its possible solutions, none has stated that basic political 
definitions are at the root of it. The crux of the matter is whether social organization (and the basic 
political forces which uphold it) can truly bring about the changes which must be introduced in 
development styles in order to achieve the goals which these documents propose. It is precisely 
in the political capacity to achieve these transformations that the greatest challenge lies. 
It is in this context that I wish to turn now to the subject of energy, which has recently 
concerned me personally, and which is another of the angles from which the styles of 
development currently predominating in the world can be examined. 
THE ENERGY PROBLEM: GENERAL CONCERNS 
To begin, I wish to clarify some of the remarks made previously. Firstly, I am not an expert on 
energy, and therefore I shall merely attempt to convey the impressions of one who examines the 
problem from the economic point of view. Second, I shall attempt to approach the problem by 
identifying the main challenges to be faced by developing countries in the years to come, and to 
consider the options these societies may have, with special regard to the Latin American 
countries. 
The influence of energy on the prevailing style of development has already been pointed out 
by Osvaldo Sunkel.1 There is no doubt that the type of energy which mankind has preferred to use 
in past years has set its stamp, in one way or another, on both the development style and the 
lifestyle of all the countries in the world. Under this style, economic development was stimulated 
mainly by technological achievements, which in turn depended closely on the energy base 
available. It was the development of these new technologies which facilitated the unprecedented 
flowering of the productive forces of humanity. 
Obviously, this development style and the technological change which sustained it were 
made possible by the provision of a new type of energy, hydrocarbons, which for many decades 
was characterized by its relative abundance, the flexibility with which it could be used in various 
patterns of technology and, especially, its low cost. 
This development style based on the introduction of new and cheap forms of energy 
facilitated the attainment by today's societies (or at least by their élites) of the levels of well-being 
which they currentiy enjoy. One quarter of humanity was thus able to reach unprecedented levels 
ofliving with extremely "sophisticated" technological advances based, of course, on the provision 
of cheap energy. 
Clearly, the developing countries were influenced by a development style and type of 
technology based on these abundant and cheap sources of energy. And this life style gradually 
penetrated with particular virulence into certain groups of our societies, since the imitation of 
more opulent societies made us susceptible to all the forms of consumerism they had developed. 
In this way, Western civilization, or at the least its external trappings, penetrated to all corners of 
the earth, the every community and culture, and included all societies under identical rules of 
production and consumption which could thereafter no longer survive without the energy base 
which had sustained them for a number of decades. 
In 1973 came the "energy crisis", which had two important effects. The first was that, through 
an intelligent association of the petroleum-producing countries, the above-mentioned cycle 
based on cheap energy was brought to an end. The industrialized world had developed over the 
See his report "Los estilos de desarrollo y el medio ambiente en el proceso histórico reciente de América Latina", 
presented at the regional Seminar mentioned earlier. 
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past thirty years through the continuous extraction, at greatly reduced cost, of a resource located 
mainly in the developing countries (the Arab countries produce 70% of the world's supply of 
hydrocarbons). The second effect of this crisis was to reveal for the first time the danger that the 
growth of hydrocarbon reserves would fall behind the growth rate of consumption of that resource 
and that during the next decade it would be difficult to maintain the world energy balance if the 
current growth rate of consumption continued. Indeed, if that rate is maintained in future years 
we will be in grave danger of facing an international fuel shortage and at some point before the 
end of the century the production curve could start to decrease. This situation raised a very serious 
quandary for a civilization which had drastically transformed its energy balance, was depending 
less and less on coal, and was nourishing its rapid expansion mainly on hydrocarbons. This was 
what was called the energy crisis. 
All the consequences of this crisis, and not merely its impact on balance-of-payment posi-
tions, must be considered. It is undoubtedly one of the most complex and dramatic crises of the 
century, and should be approached from various angles. 
Firstly, we are facing a technical problem, because essentially we must determine what 
humanity's options are when faced with the possible exhaustion of a source which is the mainstay 
of the current energy balance. 
It is an economic problem, because whatever energy options the future may bring us, the 
price of the various sources of energy will be much higher than at present, since substitute sources 
of petroleum cost much more than the traditional sources on which humanity has based its 
development in the last few years. 
It is a political problem because, for the first time, the developing world is reversing the 
traditional relations of dependency and is working together to obtain a higher price for one of its 
basic products through an exceptional demonstration of political organization which has allowed 
the Third World to react intelligently and to place North-South relations, also for the first time, on 
an interdependent rather than dependent basis. 
It is also a psychological problem because, as I see it, either by the force of events or the will 
of the participants, one of the most formidable international information machines has been 
created and is forming images in the public mind which may distort the reality of the facts. 
Through these images, it is sought to attribute the responsibility for the current international 
economic crisis solely to the petroleum-exporting countries, which can only be explained as the 
result of an unfortunate distortion of international public opinion which fuels passions and makes 
any form of constructive international dialogue much more difficult. 
Finally, it contributes to the generation of broader political problems, for we cannot ignore 
that behind the subject of petroleum lie political problems which transcend it. It is well known 
that petroleum has often been used as a weapon to achieve other political objectives, and that 
petroleum strategies are directly involved in the whole political crisis in the Middle East. 
At all events, the balance of forces in the world has been changed, thus giving this discussion 
an entirely new character and making the question extremely complex. For it is not a purely 
technical problem; rather, it is at once an economic, political, psychological and information 
problem. 
In spite of the numerous aspects of the energy crisis, I feel that its most important trait is the 
uncertainty which it has created on a world scale. It is precisely this uncertainty that makes an 
international dialogue essential, and the separate groups of countries must be brought together to 
discuss their respective interests and search for ways to co-operate for their mutual benefit. 
FACTS AND UNCEñTAINTIES OF THE ENERGY PROBLEM 
Among this vast range of uncertainties, there are some facts which deserve special attention. 
The first fact is that the production of hydrocarbons is approaching economic limits which 
could mean that in the next decade and until the end of this century, there will be a severe 
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imbalance between supply and demand, with serious danger of temporary shortages and 
tremendous vulnerability to any type of international conflict. The political crisis in Iran has 
recently shown the extent to which we are treading an extremely narrow path between supply and 
demand, with severe fluctuations which could lead to permanent tension in the world markets 
during the coming years. 
Second, the cost of energy resources will continue to rise throughout this period, and will 
approach the cost of replacing them. Naturally, the cost increase may take various forms and will 
not always continue at the same rate: it might be very rapid for the next two or three years, and 
then proceed slower and more gradually. But one fact which the entire world accepts is that 
energy costs will continue to rise in real terms. Up until three years ago, it was believed that the 
main goal in increasing prices would be to keep pace with the rate of inflation, but now I think that 
costs will continue to increase in real terms also. Some people contend that a real annual increase 
of 3 to 5% can be expected for the next decade; combined with the world inflation rate and the 
fluctuations in the most important currencies, this could lead to heavy increases in the world 
petroleum bill. This hypothesis presupposes that petroleum prices will double in nominal terms 
every few years and is certainly far from being the most pessimistic projection, if the recent 
behaviour of prices is taken into account. 
Third, if the prices of energy resources climb fasterthan world inflation does, petroleum gluts 
and financial surpluses will become a common phenomenon in the future, especially in some 
countries. This will mean that international money markets will be influenced by surpluses of 
historically unprecedented magnitude which will play an important role in the world economy, 
depending upon what recycling machinery is adopted, either through the traditional methods of 
the past or through new ones which might be developed through international co-operation. 
Fourth, increased prices will lead to conservationist policies, even though their results will 
not be immediately apparent. At best one can say that technology has shown that with appropriate 
policies, normal consumption levels can be reduced by 20 to 30% in future years. This reduction, 
although extremely important, will not solve the fundamental problems, however. 
Fifth, everyone agrees that the developing world's ability to decrease its consumption of 
energy is greatly inferior to that of the developed world. Developing countries need much more 
energy than they are currently consuming, and will probably have to increase their rates of energy 
consumption much faster than their growth rates, which must be increased in the future if the 
developing world is to solve its economic and social problems. In other words, these countries 
cannot significantly contain or restrict their energy consumption without hampering their 
development processes. In the developed countries, on the other hand, the margin for reduction 
of energy consumption is much wider since, because of the degree of development achieved by 
their economies, their consumption of energy can increase more slowly than the product does. 
Sixth, although there are other extremely important sources of energy, among which coal and 
nuclear energy are especially promising, it will take some time before they can be effectively 
utilized. Any investment in the nuclear field takes ten to fifteen years to start giving its fruits, and 
other foreseeable options, such as the liquefaction of coal, will also require fifteen years to affect 
the market supply. There are extremely promising possibilities in the area of renewable 
resources, but their effects are also difficult to forecast, at least in terms of commercial 
exploitation. In other words, there is no reason why petroleum should cease to be fundamental to 
the world provision of energy in the future, and consequently hydrocarbons will continue to make 
up over 50% of the world energy balance. 
These are the facts which are generally accepted. Now let us consider the controversial 
matters. 
No one knows exactly what the world's real capacity for hydrocarbon production is, in spite of 
the fact that there are said to be extensive as yet untapped deposits. Apparently, there are 
resources in many regions, including Latin America, but the economic and technical difficulties 
of exploiting them are still unknown. These resources would facilitate surmounting the 
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limitations which the world is facing in the provision of energy products, but would not allow the 
present share of hydrocarbons in the total supply to be maintained. 
We know that there are extensive resources in the world for use in the generation of atomic 
energy, but this is a field fraught with great uncertainty because of plant security, the advantages 
and disadvantages of the different technological options, the disposal of radioactive wastes and 
other related problems. In this field, we again confront not only an economic problem but also a 
technical, political and psychological one, as indicated by the great variety of opinions currently 
held on the subject in different countries. 
The other great uncertainty involves the application of energy policies. The North does not 
agree as to what is the best way to handle this matter. There are two schools of thought: those who 
feel that the market will solve these problems and that prices should therefore be allowed to act as 
the main regulator, and those who demand more and more insistently that voluntary or 
interventionist measures should be adopted, including even rationing, as the President of the 
United States has proposed: a heresy that is hard to accept for those who worship the power of the 
market. 
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 
Having said this, and without going into further detail, the problem seems to present itself in two 
phases: the long-term challenges, and those which we must face in the transitional period. 
Looking at the long term, and assuming that my interpretation of what the technical experts 
say is correct, we can be fairly safe in taking a historically optimistic view. I think that mankind has 
begun and will greatly increase an unprecedented effort to acquire new technologies. Certainly, 
the twenty-first century will have a more solid energy base than the twentieth does, and it is very 
possible that we will then have solutions that are currently unavailable —firstly, because the 
technological progress and magnitude of investments currently being contemplated both in the 
public and private sectors are enormous, and second, because I feel that discoveries are being 
made, such as nuclear fusion and others, which will facilitate using renewable sources of energy 
that may have virtually unlimited possibilities. Therefore, it is perhaps not rash to toy with the 
hypothesis that the options which will be available to humanity in the future will be much better 
than we can currently anticipate. But this is a hypothesis that can be tested only when the twenty-
first century arrives. 
Another field in which important experiments are being carried out, especially in the Soviet 
Union, is the generation of hydroelectric power and its transmission over long distances. Man will 
soon be able to transmit electrical energy very efficiently over thousands of kilometers; he must 
merely await the dissemination of these technologies and the procurement of the investments 
necessary to put them into practice. 
The progress being made in the technology of coal transformation is another promising fact, 
as is solar energy, which is developing in the same direction. 
With regard to renewable sources of energy, the Brazilian "green energy" experiment is full 
of promise and one of the most outstanding options that I have seen. Brazil is using agricultural 
and forestry products or wastes to generate new forms of energy which could become a major 
substitute for current liquid fuels. 
Nor must we forget the progress being made in social organization. The public is developing 
greater sensitivity to the need for conservation policies, and this will mean that in fields such as 
transport and urban organization, society will opt for technologies based on alternative energy 
solutions or, in the industrial sector, new, energy-saving techniques. 
I feel that all these elements justify some historical optimism, based on the group of 
alternatives which will allow us to confront the energy problem on a long-term basis. 
12 CEPAL REVIEW No. 10 / April 1980 
THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE 
However , the energy problem is much more difficult during the transitional period. Let us 
consider the facts of this matter. 
First of all, as just stated, there is no doubt that during this period the consumption of 
hydrocarbons will continue to be basic for the functioning of society. All,the possible options will 
bear fruit only in the long term, with a few exceptions such as, perhaps, "green energy". 
Second, prices will continue to increase, and increase they must. I think that a major error of 
recent years has been to have allowed prices to decrease in real terms after 1973. The world must 
become accustomed to the idea that with a scarce and non-renewable resource like petroleum, the 
only solution is to increase its price until it reaches that of other substitute forms of energy. If we 
agree that the price of these other forms of energy is higher than the current price of hydrocarbons, 
there is no reason, either economic or technical, to believe that prices should not continue to rise 
systematically. The question of how they should rise, at what pace and under what types of 
international agreements, is another matter. 
Third, the importance of a less-discussed but perhaps more important subject should be 
stressed: the investments that will be required during the transitional period until a new type of 
world energy balance is reached. 
Currently, the world has three major reference costs. There is the reference cost of light 
petroleum (Saudi petroleum), the extraction of which requires investments fluctuating around 
US$ 2,000 per barrel of daily production (in 1978 dollars). In addition to this type of petroleum, 
which constitutes the bulk of the world's production, we have petroleum from those countries that 
must pay intermediate costs ranging from US$ 6,000 to 8,000 per barrel. Finally, there is a small 
minority of cases, including that of Alaska and the countries which must extract fuels from 
submarine areas, which require investments already totalling US$ 20,000 per barrel. 
The share of these different sources in the world provision of hydrocarbons is changing 
significantly. The most expensive sources of petroleum will continue progressively to replace the 
most inexpensive ones. Simultaneously, producers will have to take account of the investments, 
generally higher, required to exploit new sources of the resource, which will determine the price 
for replacing the resources currently being exploited. All of the above will strongly influence the 
cost structure of this product, and consequently basic costs will shift. According to some reliable 
estimates, the petroleum whose extraction currently costs some US$ 2,000 must generate 
resources to cover investments of approximately US$ 6,000 per barrel, while petroleum which 
currently costs US$ 8,000 must finance investments of US$ 14,000, and it will also be necessary to 
obtain petroleum through the third type of extraction, which will entail investments of 
approximately US$ 30,000 to US$ 35,000 per barrel. In other words, a production of 250,000 
barrels per day, which in a country like Saudi Arabia currently requires an investment of US$ 500 
million, will in ten years require investments of approximately US$ 5,000 million, both for new 
sources of energy and conventional ones. 
This implies a spectacular change in the world's demand for hydrocarbon investment 
resources, which will be accompanied by similar changes in other fields. There is general 
agreement that the investment effort which mankind will have to make to confront the energy 
challenge in the future will assume spectacular proportions. Whatever hypothesis on the world 
energy balance is assumed, mankind will have to multiply by five or six the sums currently 
allocated to developing the sector. This is an extremely important fact which must be kept in mind 
when analysing the future of Latin America. 
Simultaneously, another phenomenon exists: the persistence and growth of huge financial 
flows. Last year, all the countries in the world combined paid a petroleum bill of approximately 
US$ 240,000 million, of which OPEC received US$ 210,000 million. Of this amount, US$ 50,000 
million went to the Euromoney market and the rest was spent on imports, primarily from the 
industrialized world, which is by far the greatest beneficiary of these surpluses because it 
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capitalized intelligently on their growth. Of the US$ 50,000 million channelled through various 
forms oí international recycling, the major part went to the Euromoney market, which naturally 
provided financing amounting to a much higher figure and received a significant portion of the 
financial surpluses obtained by the OPEC countries. Ultimately, the international private 
banking system was the main provider of the financial resourses used to balance the deficit in the 
external accounts of the various countries of the world, especially the developing countries. Last 
year, these financial requirements came to US$ 8,000 million in the case of Mexico, US$ 6,000 
million in Brazil, US$ 3,500 million in South Korea and China, US$ 2,000 million in Argentina and 
Taiwan, etc. 
This extraordinary state of international liquidity is currently one of the main problems of the 
world economy because of the uncertainty that it creates, but at the same time it has come to be the 
main source of financing for many countries in the world. The member countries of OPEC will 
continue to contribute a substantial portion of these resources, especially since some of them will 
have a permanent surplus because within their own frontiers they are unable productively to 
absorb investments of the size which their petroleum income makes possible. 
This means that throughout the transitional period, balance-of-payments crises will be the 
order of the day for many countries. It is impossible really to predict what forms these crises will 
take, or what should be done to manage them, because the prices of other products are changing 
along with petroleum prices. Furthermore, the prices of food and other commodities, 
manufactured goods, and especially capital goods are also increasing. The developing countries 
have reacted differently to these situations: some, such as Brazil, India and Yugoslavia, which 
have large deficits, have launched ambitious policies for expanding their production and exports 
of manufactures. Others are exporting their manpower to the Persian Gulf and are receiving 
impressive sums from remittances made by their emigrants, which often exceed the yield of their 
exports. Both groups of countries are beginning to build their own defences, but other countries 
are in a completely hopeless situation because they have no manufactured goods, lack the 
conditions necessary to send their workers abroad and also lack access to international money 
markets. Thus, very different situations exist in the world and make this subject a multifaceted 
one at the international level. 
At all events, today there is a very clear feeling that the new investment drive in the world will 
mainly benefit the developed countries, which are capable of developing new technologies and 
spearhead industries and using them to penetrate international markets. 
The developing countries, in my view, fall into three categories. On the one hand there are 
the largest countries, which also have large solutions and are a category in themselves, such as 
Brazil, India, Yugoslavia, and to a large extent the countries of Western Asia and ASEAN, whose 
economies operate on the basis of schemes which have been successful so far. Certainly, these 
countries are not likely to become a general model, although they have brought their own 
solutions to the question, for instance increased exports and access to international money 
markets. At the other end are the smallest countries, the poorest of the world, whose consumption 
oí energy is extremely low and will continue to be so in future years. These are in a sense the most 
helpless of all, although the rate of their development process does not create excessively high 
energy requirements and they may continue, at least in some sectors, to use non-commercial 
sources of energy. Finally, an intermediate group of countries, including the Latin American 
countries in general, are the worst off of all, because they have a development style imported from 
the industrialized countries, with an accelerated rate of urbanization and industrialization, an 
automobile-based civilization that has penetrated into their most remote areas, and cultural 
imitations of every kind, but without the ability to defend themselves which the larger countries 
have. 
This explains why the initial reactions to this difficult international situation came from some 
Latin American countries which have experienced the consequences of the energy crisis more 
acutely than other developing countries. These reactions were provoked mainly by the public 
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sectors and by those social groups which felt most heavily the weight of the adjustment measures 
required during the above-mentioned transitional period. As if that were not enough, this all took 
place within an international climate strongly affected by inflation and the stagnation of the 
industrialized economies. The growth prospects of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) are bleak and disturbing, and because of the perplexity regarding the 
evolution ol the world economy, solutions are uncertain or are constantly overtaken by events. 
In sum, no machinery to confront these phenomena is in sight. The only solution put forward 
so far seems to be a slightly naive revival of neo-monetarism: an attempt to overcome the 
Keynesian rules of the 1930s which have been shown to be efficient in weathering the financial 
storm, but incapable of rebuilding the real economies of the countries of a world in crisis while 
simultaneously controlling inflation. They are excellent strategies for achieving deflation, but 
ineffective for promoting the ordinary and stable growth of the central economies. 
Because of this, it is a source of great satisfaction to note that new trends which stress the 
structural adjustment of supply are now appearing. These theories, which seem novel in the 
United States, are well known here in CEPAL, where they were adopted many decades ago. But 
we live in a world of great complexity which is re-applying older formulas that do not give the 
desired results and is heading uncertainly towards the search for new solutions. 
We must prepare ourselves to face a decade which is dominated by a difficult economic 
situation and throughout which inflation and stagnation will probably continue to coexist. This 
will mean a much more serious situation than that of 1973, because it must not be forgotten that in 
that year the economic situation was comfortable: our countries had a relatively low level of debt 
and a much better ability to react. 
WHAT CAN WE DO? 
We must now face the obvious question, and here I shall argue for an equally obvious theory: 
firstly, out of moral conviction, second on account of my personal beliefs, and third, because I am 
an official of the United Nations, which believes absolutely in dialogue. This position may seem 
overly idealistic in a world where not everyone is in favour of dialogue and where, on the contrary, 
there seem to be forces working in favour of chaos, which would mean a gloomy future for 
humanity. Unfortunately, if the current systems persist we may not be far from chaos, and perhaps 
some irrational forces may be thinking that this is the only option at present. For this reason, 
common sense and the vision oí great political leaders must prevail against what could become a 
real holocaust, if a true international dialogue is not established. 
I believe, then, that dialogue is absolutely essential and, furthermore, that it is possible, 
because for the first time we have conditions that will allow the various sectors involved in the 
matters being discussed to seat themselves at a single table, bringing to it a range of interests 
which can be reconciled through negotiation. 
What the developed countries want today is an orderly evolution of the world economy and 
international prices: in other words, they are interested in the possibility of restructuring the 
world economy on a joint basis. What the OPEC countries want is that the world should respect 
their right to defend the value of their natural resources, so that they can gain the technological 
resources required to develop their economies and can guarantee their supply of food. The non-
oil-exporting developing countries, for their part, want to acquire the elements necessary to 
survive the current crisis and to be able to promote the development which we all desire. All of 
these interests could be reconciled in a well-organized dialogue. 
In order to make this dialogue possible, however, I believe that the international community 
must first accept certain principles and second, certain attitudes, which are primarily political. 
Some of these principles, which I see as basic and upon which any international dialogue 
must be founded (a dialogue which must take place within the framework of the United Nations), 
are the following. 
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Firstly, we must recognize that there are no alternatives to a global dialogue. Here we must 
weigh the specialized interests of the industrialized countries, which wish only tô discuss the 
question of energy, against those of the developing countries which contend and rightly so, that 
the dialogue should be global. I believe that at this point further discussion becomes academic: 
there really is no way to avoid a global dialogue, since if we sit down at a table to discuss only 
energy problems, we cannot complete the discussion without also considering world inflation, 
the functioning of money markets and the prospects for economic growth. In other words, the 
dialoge will immediately take on global dimensions. 
The second principle is that during the transitional period, the countries which can make the 
greatest contribution towards the orderly development of the process are those which currently 
consume the greatest energy resources: the developed countries. It is useless for the developing 
world to save on electric light bulbs if the United States, which continues to consume one-third of 
the world's energy, fails to reply with clear and resolute conservationist actions. In other words, a 
decisive contribution to an energy conservation strategy can only be made by the industrialized 
countries, and above all the United States. I think that if we agree on this matter, the international 
dialogue will have a much better chance of success. 
Third, as we have said, we must accept the fact that the cost of fuel will continue to rise, since 
this is the only way to ensure that the world will awaken from the unreal, irresponsible dream in 
which it has slumbered for the past thirty years, during which it based its entire development 
process on the provision of an inordinately cheap source of energy. 
The fourth principle is that there can be no dialogue unless certain global responsibilities 
which are incumbent upon humanity as a whole are accepted. The first responsibility involves the 
world balance-of-payments position. It is senseless to insist that only the OPEC countries, in the 
case of the Third World, can solve this problem, when it is clear that in reality it can only be solved 
through the commitment of the entire international community. The subject of investments is 
likewise a global one and represents a challenge which, in my view, could be much more 
important than the problem of the balance-of payments positions. The world must accept that 
energy investment implies a responsibility for the entire international community. It is 
debatable, to say the very least, whether Algeria or Venezuela should invest their petroleum 
surpluses in the development of new sources of hydrocarbons when this petroleum will be 
consumed by Europe or the United States. In the final analysis, this investment is the joint 
responsibility of the major consumers. This is a new idea in the international community, but we 
must continue to develop it. On the other hand, if the developing countries can increase their 
energy investments while simultaneously sustaining their development, the demand on world 
energy markets will decrease, thus facilitating orderly market development and decreasing the 
pressure on scarce resources. This will be in the interests of the industrialized countries, which 
are responsible for 90% of the world demand for hydrocarbons. 
Furthermore, the investments which will be required in the petroleum sector are so large that 
unless the principle of world responsibility for them is accepted, the petroleum-producing 
countries and the developing countries will have to contribute beyond their means, for the effort 
will compete strongly with their global investment needs. This is a fundamental matter for Latin 
America, and I will return to it later. 
The third global responsibility involves technology, and here we face one of the greatest 
challenges. According to the statements made during the recent Vienna conference, the 
international community must accept that technological progress is, by definition, the common 
heritage of mankind. The technological efforts being made at present must be expanded and 
transferred, especially to the developing countries. 
I believe that the responsibility for managing the international money system is also global, 
and that the world is facing an extremely serious problem, to which the OPEC countries must 
react with financial discipline in the management of surpluses if the system is to continue to 
support world economic development. This is probably the most crucial problem for the 
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international community at present. The possibility of an international financial crisis implies 
collective responsibility on the part of all the countries of the world, and they must make an effort 
to consider the problem seriously within the framework of the International Monetary Fund and 
the United Nations, which must play an important role in the future management of this process. 
It would be highly inadvisable for this to be left to the vicissitudes of struggles among financial 
groups or the special interests which are behind them. 
Finally, there is a fifth principle, the recognition of the need to develop "South-South" co-
operation, which I have intentionally left until last because here we find that international public 
opinion is somewhat at a loss to know what to think. Let us not deceive ourselves: the problems of 
the Third World will not be solved solely through South-South co-operation; the developing 
countries cannot solve their problems alone. Nevertheless, this co-operation front is a fundamental 
aspect of the Third World's self-defence and assertion of its own identity, and the developing 
countries must remain united to sustain any negotiating strategy with the industrialized nations. 
However, we must not assume that the solution of the energy problems affecting the Third World 
can be left to this type of co-operation alone. 
All of the above calls for the establishment of negotiating procedures or machinery. And I 
must note with satisfaction here that, in principle, this mechanism has already been drawn up in 
the General Assembly. The solution of current North-South problems depends to a large extent on 
the rounds of global negotiations which are being completed within that body. 
I said a moment ago that in order for the dialogue to take place, certain political attitudes must 
be developed. The international dialogue is truly a political process and can only be developed by 
defining our political attitudes. We face an international crisis of major proportions, and only 
political decisions equal to the crisis will allow us to solve it. We must keep in mind that these 
decisions will have to be adopted in a climate of generalized mistrust caused by economic 
uncertainty, political differences and the very novelty of the problems with which the world is 
faced. And it is disturbing that at present there is no clear sense of progress towards a political 
commitment on which to base the dialogue and build a new system of international co-operation. 
MEASURES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
I wish now to refer briefly to what must be done at the national level, with special regard to the 
Latin American countries. This is a subject on which CEPAL must work quickly. We must 
consider the elements that will make up the development strategy for the 1980s, and define the 
actions to be taken on the internal front. 
Firstly, we must recognize the differences between Latin American countries, because there 
is no doubt that between Mexico and Brazil on the one hand and Uruguay and Costa Rica on the 
other there are striking disparities. Accordingly, the countries face very different situations and 
problems. But there are also common denominators, and I wish to point out three or four of those 
which I feel are important. The need to take action to adjust to the increased price of energy, 
international inflation and the protectionism of the industrialized countries are examples of these 
common needs, whose cost might increase dangerously as a consequence of the stagnation of the 
central economies. 
A second common element is the need to face up to the serious problems of the balance of 
payments, an area where, as I have already pointed out, the international community must assume 
its share of responsibility, but where solutions must also be sought both on the national and the 
regional level. 
A third important element is the need for countries to adopt stringent conservation policies 
—on the basis of some promising experiments which have been carried out in the industrial 
sector, in transport, urban development and rural organization— and, if necessary, to institute the 
rationing of energy consumption. 
Fourthly, there is the need to diversify energy sources according to the situation and 
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capability of each country. Thus, for example, Nicaragua must continue to develop geothermal 
energy and Uruguay, hydroelectric energy, while Brazil should emphasize green energy. In 
short, each country should try to find its own energy balance on the basis of its natural resources. 
A fifth and extremely important consideration is that of investments. Whatever the 
capabilities of each country in this field, huge investments will be required to develop them. 
Energy objectives can therefore be expected to compete with other economic development 
objectives from the point of view of the assignment of the resources available for investment. 
Indeed, the demand for investment will be formidable, and will pose a serious challenge to 
development programming in the coming years. 
This leads us to give a warning that the development of the energy sector may involve intense 
competition with the social and economic development requirements of our countries in the next 
years. Nor should we forget that energy investments have long lead times before they bear fruit. It 
is therefore highly probable that the solution of the energy problems will generate and sustain 
regressive trends affecting the social structure which will be much stronger in the upcoming 
decade than during the 1970s. 
But we must not become discouraged about the impact that such a group of measures could 
have, especially if we recall the as yet unutilized energy potential in Latin America. For example, 
this region has one of the largest potentials in the world for the production of hydroelectric 
energy: 30% greater than that of the Soviet Union, double that of the United States and Canada 
combined, and four times that of Europe. The importance of this fact can be seen when we 
consider that at present only 15% of the potential just mentioned is being exploited. 
MEASURES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
We must now consider what measures could be adopted in Latin America as a whole —an 
extremely delicate subject concerning which I wish merely to sketch out some thoughts. 
This region of the world which has tried out all posible co-operation efforts, could well set 
itself novel goals in this field. In this connexion, it is very encouraging to note that the Latin 
American Energy Organization (OLADE) is acquiring its own momentum, as shown by its recent 
meet ing in Costa Rica, where the Latin American countries united to consider this subject at the 
highest level. There is no doubt that OLADE will be called upon to play an extremely important 
role in the next decade. It is equally encouraging to see that Venezuela has offered to represent 
the interests of Latin America within OPEC in order to achieve better co-operation from that 
organization: this is an extremely important political development. 
But we must also move towards new frontiers. I believe that the search for new forms of 
regional co-operation in this field should be greatly intensified in the next few years. Both the 
Latin American Economic System (SELA) and CEPAL must carry out extremely important 
functions in this connexion. Why should not Latin America consider developing an energy co-
operation programme that would allow us to achieve security of supply in the event of world 
upheavals or conflicts? Why should not we envisage a programme of technological co-operation 
with the participation of UNDP, a body which is making extremely important contributions to that 
field? Why should not we consider achieving greater co-operation in the field of investments, 
which must become a fundamental element in the development of the energy sector, by 
deliberately using the energy investments that must be made to stimulate the internal 
development of countries: a policy in which the Inter-Am encan Development Bank (IDB) could 
play an important role? Why should we not search for better co-operation with regard to markets, 
using the advantages of geographical proximity and commercial complementarity and formu-
lating appropriate agreements and machinery? I believe that these are extremely important 
subjects regarding which an optimistic attitude must be maintained in an area of the world like our 
IS CEPAL REVIEW No. 10 / April 1980 
own which has tried all possible forms of co-operation. At the same time, however, they are 
subjects which pose an important political challenge. 
In sum, I believe that we are entering a period that will be characterized by an awakening 
responsibility regarding these matters. Humanity, and especially the industrialized countries, is 
leaving behind a long period of blindness and irresponsibility concerning the subject. It will be 
difficult for history to explain how man could have lived through this period without becoming 
aware that the great industrial centres were expanding through the extraction of energy resources, 
especially from the Third World, at inordinately low prices and with imminent prospects of their 
exhaustion. It will be difficult to explain why a gradual process of adjusting prices was not 
undertaken earlier, and why serious policies for long-term substitution were not applied. I 
bel ieve that this awakening responsibility on the part of all the countries in the world as regards 
energy must be accompanied by an effort to clarify the ideas for the man in the street: a task in 
which the United Nations must play an important role, since public opinion on this subject has 
been greatly distorted for many decades. 
This awakening responsibility on the part of the international community will present new 
challenges to planning; it will be necessary to reduce current uncertainties. The decisions which 
may be adopted in the next few years will affect the future of humanity for two or three decades. 
T h e Latin American countries possess all the elements required to understand the importance of 
planning in this field: let us not forget that Latin America learned to plan because of energy. 
Nevertheless, our countries will require support to perfect this process, and here the CEPAL 
system must make a major contribution. The socialist experience in the energy field must also 
be reviewed and examined, for in many respects the socialist countries are much better prepared 
to face the energy challenge than is the capitalist world. 
Simultaneously, however, the current crisis will create new opportunities for stimulating our 
economies; the industrialized world is already fully aware of this and believes that the energy 
transition will mean a "Schumpeterian" period, marked by impressive development of its 
productive forces. Unfortunately, this view is mainly confined to the countries of the North. To 
what extent can the investments required for the development of energy resources be used to 
stimulate the growth of the developing countries? And, simultaneously, to what extent must this 
growth be based on styles and policies that differ from those of the past if the problems posed by 
the energy crisis are to be reduced to manageable dimensions? 
As I have already stated, the priority given to energy development could also have socially 
regressive consequences, because it will inevitably involve a far-reaching reorientation of 
investments. In order to reconcile energy objectives with social development goals, we must 
carefully weigh the energy options which arise in the light of their impact on employment, where 
appropriate technologies must be adopted, agricultural development and food production, and 
other elements that will strongly affect the social development of our countries. 
What does seem obvious is that energy factors must weigh much more heavily in the planning 
process than they have in the past. I fully agree with what was said to me by a Minister in the 
Indian Government: "We who studied at Oxford and Cambridge came to India, and before 
making an economic decision we thought of its impact on the balance of payments. Today, 
however, before making an economic decision we think of its impact on the energy balance". This 
applies equally to Latin America, where we must begin to see things in the same light. 
I am convinced that the weight of energy factors and other factors which are taking on 
growing importance in the world today will determine the changes to be made in the next 
decades, and many of those changes will originate in the North. I am aware that these changes will 
generate strong resistance, and that those who currently benefit from the advantages of the 
current style will be ready to make superhuman efforts to maintain it, or to transfer its negative 
consequences to other social sectors. Nevertheless, I also believe that it will be very difficult to 
stifle the anxieties of the vast majority of mankind, which currently is so gravely affected by the 
THE ENERGY CHALLENGE / Enrique V. Iglesias 19 
consequences of this style. For this reason, I am convinced that it will inevitably be changed. This 
is an essentially political task, wherein it is necessary more than ever to appeal for a degree of 
social voluntarism. The market has shown clearly that it is incapable of effecting lasting solutions. 
For that reason, these solutions are not yet in sight. CEPAL must be aware of these problems, and 
I hope that the contribution it can make to solving them will transform it into a kind of critical 
conscience of Latin American development. 
